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Abstract 
Employing an environmentally differentiated duopoly model, we analyze how emission 
standards affect imports, the environment, and social welfare. We show that a strict emission 
standard is not necessarily import-restrictive, whereas it may possibly degrade the environment. 
Furthermore, we present evidence that the effect of emission standards on net social surplus 
depends on the mode of market competition and the degree of marginal social valuation of 
environmental damage. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A government often restricts imports from foreign countries for reasons of environmental 
protection, public health, social security, and others. For example, regulations on emissions and 
noise of imported vehicles are classified as types of non-tariff barriers, i.e., technical barriers to 
trade (hereafter, TBT), under the GATT/WTO system. Accordingly, the government, if it is a 
member of the GATT/WTO, should set technical regulations and standards in accordance with 
the GATT/WTO agreement on TBT without unnecessarily increasing barriers to foreign trade.  
Hence, the following questions are important. Is an emission standard policy trade-
restrictive? Can an emission standard policy improve the environment? Furthermore, how does 
an emission standard policy affect social welfare? We develop answers to these questions, using 
a model of environmentally differentiated products. That is, the purpose of this paper is to 
analyze how an emission standard such as a TBT affects imports, the environment, and the 
social surplus of an importing country.  
Many studies analyze the effect of environmental policy in the context of the global 
economy. That is, there are effects from environmental policies such as emission taxes, emission 
standards, and eco-labeling on the structure of international trade, production and consumption, 
and social welfare. For example, some important studies are those of Conrad (1993), Barrett 
(1994), Kennedy (1994), Mani (1996), Ulph (1996, 1999), Rauscher (1997), Copeland and 
Taylor (2003), and Neary (2006). They argue that polluting waste and environmental effluent 
are by-products of production processes in manufacturing industries, and assume that consumers 
are homogenous.  
As mentioned in Valentini (2005), however, we have been observing a growing demand for 
environmental care. That is, consumers will purchase products that are more environment-
friendly or that are produced with more environment-friendly techniques. This implies that 
consumers strictly care about products imported from foreign countries as well as produced in 
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the domestic country. Also, there is enough evidence that firms are aware of the consumers’ 
behavior. 
We deal with products associated with environmental characteristics in a green market 
where effluents and noises are by-products of consumption by heterogeneous consumers, who 
differ in terms of their willingness to pay for the products according to the product’s 
environmental quality. In fact, the environmental damage caused by the polluting wastes and 
effluents associated with the consumption of these products may be external for individual 
consumers. However, consumers who are very conscious of destruction of the environment 
would purchase an environment-friendly product even if its price was higher than that of an 
environmentally unfriendly product. Furthermore, consumers who are not concerned about the 
environment purchase a lower-priced product. That is, consumers differ in their degree of 
consciousness about the environment (Scherhorn, 1993). For example, in the context of car 
exhaust fumes, the emission level of a car with a hybrid engine is much lower than that of a car 
with a diesel engine. Hence, consumers who care about global warming and air pollution prefer 
the hybrid car, whereas other consumers do not. Furthermore, more extreme environmentalists 
may not purchase any type of car, but instead ride a bicycle. 
Valentini (2005), which is related to our paper, surveys environmental quality provision and 
eco-labeling based on product differentiation models. He considers eco-labeling, but does not 
examine the effect of an emission standard policy. Furthermore, Jayadevappa and Chhatre 
(2000) discuss issues such as establishing the effects of international trade on environmental 
quality in a comprehensive literature review.  
Because a unit emission level of products in a green market is similar to environmental 
quality, our paper is closely related to the literature on minimum quality standards (Ronnen, 
1991; Valletti, 2000) and on minimum environmental standards (Motta and Thisse, 1999). In 
particular, Motta and Thisse (1999) analyze the impact of environmental quality standards on 
market structure and welfare. As will be described below, there are negative externalities 
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involved in the consumption decisions, but what matters from an individual consumer’s 
perspective is the environmental quality of the product personally purchased. Accordingly, they 
do not consider the impact of an environmental quality standard on totally accumulated 
pollutants. This implies that the welfare function does not include a term accounting for the 
social cost of pollution. However, in this paper, we show that aggregate emissions, which are 
by-products of the consumption of imported products, increase environmental damage of the 
importing country, and thereby decrease social welfare. Thus, the importing government would 
develop an emission standard policy, taking the negative environmental externalities into 
account. Furthermore, Motta and Thisse (1999) deal with the Bertrand duopoly case; however, 
we address the Cournot duopoly case as well as the Bertrand duopoly case. 
In this paper, incorporating the preference behavior of heterogeneous consumers presented 
by Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero (2002), we examine the effect of an emission standard 
on imports, the environment, and social surplus. Here, we recall that the effect of a policy may 
depend on the mode of market competition. For example, as shown in Eaton and Grossman 
(1986), in the Cournot (Bertrand) duopoly case, the optimal strategic export policy is a subsidy 
(tax, respectively). As shown below, we present evidence that the effects of an emission 
standard depend on the mode of market competition and the degree of marginal social valuation 
of environmental damage. Specifically, we present evidence for the following conclusions: 
When a foreign Bertrand duopoly prevails in the green market of an importing country, a strict 
emission standard on a dirtier product worsens the environment, whereas it increases the total 
consumer surplus. Thus, if the importing government is significantly concerned about the 
environment, the emission standard reduces the net social surplus included in the social 
valuation of environmental damage. On the other hand, when a foreign Cournot duopoly 
prevails in the green market, a strict emission standard improves the environment and thus 
increases the net social surplus. 
Furthermore, an emission standard policy is usually oriented towards levy charges on 
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polluting products or lower environmental quality products, such as a minimum quality 
requirement. However, from a theoretical viewpoint, to compare the results derived in the case 
of an emission standard policy for the dirtier product, we assume that the importing government 
can regulate the unit emission level of the cleaner product. That is, the importing government 
can force the exporting foreign firms to adopt a green strategy policy. In this case, we present 
the following conclusions: When a foreign Bertrand duopoly prevails in the green market of an 
importing country, a strict emission control on the cleaner product improves the environment 
and thus increases the net social surplus included in the social valuation of environmental 
damage. On the other hand, when a foreign Cournot duopoly prevails in the market, because a 
strict emission control worsens the environment, it reduces the net social surplus if the 
importing government is significantly concerned about the environment. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
first shows the free trade equilibrium, and then examines the effects of emission standard on 
imports, the environment, and social welfare in the case of a foreign Bertrand duopoly. Similarly, 
Section 4 analyzes the case of a foreign Cournot duopoly. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our 
results and raises other issues. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
We suppose that consumers in a green market of an importing country purchase products 
imported from foreign countries. That is, there are no domestic firms producing relevant 
products. First, let us describe the structure of the green market, applying a vertical product 
differentiation model. There exists a continuum of heterogeneous consumers who differ in their 
marginal valuations, ,θ  of the green features of a product. To simplify, we assume that the 
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consumer-matching value is uniformly distributed in the market, ][ .1,0∈θ  A consumer for 
whom θ  is close to unity (zero) is conscious (not conscious) of the environment. Let e  denote 
the observable unit level of polluting emissions associated with the product. Each consumer 
purchases either one or no units of the product. The net surplus of consumer θ  who acquires the 
variant e  at a price of p  is },0,max{ pevu −−= θ  )( ,,0 ∞∈e  where v  is the utility 
obtained from consuming a single unit of the product irrespective of the variant’s unit emission 
level. A consumer who does not buy any product is assumed to have a net surplus of zero. 
There are two kinds of products in the market, which are respectively associated with a 
higher and a lower level of the unit of emission (hereafter, a dirtier and a cleaner product). 
Without loss of generality, we assume that foreign firm D (C) supplies a product with a unit 
emission level De  ( Ce , respectively) at price Dp  ( Cp , respectively), and .CD ee ≥  
We derive demand functions for environmentally differentiated products. Let us first 
consider the marginal consumer who is indifferent between the net surplus given by purchasing 
the dirtier and the cleaner product. This is characterized by .~
CD
DC
ee
pp
−
−
=θ  Furthermore, the 
index of the marginal consumer who is indifferent between the net surplus given by purchasing 
the cleaner product and nothing is characterized by 
D
C
e
pv −
=θˆ . Thus, consumer θ  falling into 
θθ ~0 <≤  )ˆ~( θθθ <<  purchases the dirtier (cleaner, respectively) product. In addition, 
consumer θ  falling into 1ˆ ≤< θθ  purchases nothing in the market. This implies that the green 
market is not completely covered by all consumers. See Figure 1. 
Let Dq )( Cq  represent the quantity demanded for the dirtier (cleaner, respectively) product. 
Given the assumption of a uniform distribution, the demand functions are expressed by: 
,~
CD
DC
D ee
ppq
−
−
== θ                                                                                                (1.1) 
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 .
)(
)()(~ˆ
CDC
DCCD
C eee
pvepveq
−
−−−
=−= θθ                                                              (1.2) 
From (1.1) and (1.2), we derive the corresponding inverse demand functions: 
,CCDDD qeqevp −−=                                                                                           (2.1) 
).( DCCC qqevp +−=                                                                                            (2.2) 
Second, let us present the characteristics of foreign firms exporting the products associated 
with environmental qualities. The cost function of a unit emission level of the product can be 
generally represented by: .,,0,0),( DCiFFeFF iiiii =>
″<′=  Following Moraga-González 
and Padrón-Fumero (2002, Assumption 2), we assume that the cost function is a homogeneous 
function of degree .2≥ε  
,εα −= DD eF                                                                                                               (3.1) 
 .ε−= CC eF                                                                                                                 (3.2) 
To avoid multiple equilibria in the decision game of the unit emission levels, we assume that the 
cost functions are sufficiently asymmetric among the firms: .1>α  Furthermore, to simplify, we 
assume that marginal costs of production are independent of the unit emission level and are zero. 
Thus, the profit function of foreign firm i is given by .,, DCiFqp iiii =−=π  
Third, we assume that the importing country’s government maximizes social welfare 
including the social valuation of environmental damage. Hence, aggregate emissions, which 
erode the environment of the importing country, are expressed by: 
 .CCDD qeqeE +=                                                                                                         (4) 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, because there are three types of consumers purchasing the 
dirtier product, those purchasing the cleaner product, and those never purchasing any products 
in the market, total consumer surplus can be represented by: 
.0)()(
ˆ
~
~
0
+−−+−−= ∫∫ CCCDDD qpdevqpdevCS θθθθ θθθ                                      (5) 
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Thus, because there is not producer surplus, net social surplus included in the social 
valuation of the environmental damage is defined by: 
 ECSW γ−≡                                                                                                               (6) 
where )0(≥γ  is the marginal social valuation of environmental damage. 
In what follows, we consider a three-stage game: in the first stage, the government 
determines an emission standard; in the second stage, foreign firms determine the unit emission 
levels, given the emission standard; and in the final stage, they compete on price or quantity in 
the market of the importing country. We derive a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by 
backward induction. 
 
 
3. Emission Standards in the Foreign Bertrand Duopoly Case 
 
3.1 Free trade equilibrium 
As the derivation of the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in the final stage is straightforward, the 
procedure of the derivation is omitted. The equilibrium quantities in the final stage are given by: 
         ,
4
1 v
ee
q
CD
B
D
−
=                                                                                                       (7.1) 
         .
)4(
2 v
eee
eq
CDC
DB
C
−
=                                                                                                (7.2)  
Hence, the revenue functions in the second stage are expressed by: 
 ,
)4(
2
2 vee
eeR
CD
CDB
D
−
−
=                                                                                               (8.1) 
   .
)4(
)(4 2
2 veee
eeeR
CDC
CDDB
C
−
−
=                                                                                   (8.2) 
In view of (3.1), (3.2), (8.1), and (8.2), the first-order conditions for profit maximization 
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with respect to the unit emission level of each firm are given by: 
 ,0
)4(
)74( 2
3 =
′
−
−
−
− D
CD
CD Fv
ee
ee
                                                                                   (9.1) 
 .0
)4(
)234(4 2
32
22
=
′
−
−
+−
− C
CDC
CCDDD Fv
eee
eeeee
                                                           (9.2) 
Based on the properties of the revenue functions, (8.1) and (8.2), as in Appendix 1, we derive 
the reaction function of the unit emission level of foreign firm i as: 
.,,,,0),( jiDCjiee ijii ≠=>
′
= ββ   
That is, the unit emission levels of the products are strategic complements for both firms in the 
Bertrand duopoly case. Furthermore, we can show that there is a unique and stable Nash 
equilibrium, },,{ BFC
BF
D ee  under the free trade case (see Appendix 2, and Moraga-González 
and Padrón-Fumero, 2002, Proposition 3). See Figure 2.  
 
3.2 Emission standard, imports, environment, and welfare 
We deal with an emission standard on the dirtier product. Suppose that the government chooses 
an emission standard lower than or equal to the level in the free trade case: .DBFD ee ≥  Hence, 
foreign firm D would choose the unit emission level of the dirtier product equal to the emission 
standard for profit maximization. 
For the analysis below, we begin by considering the effect on the ratio of emission levels of 
the products, which is given by ).
4
7(>=
C
DB
e
eλ  The effect is expressed as: 
CC
B
D
B
ed
d ηβλλ )(2)(10)( >≤⇔′<≥⇔<≥                                                           (10) 
where .
C
D
D
C
C
B
e
e
e
e
∂
∂
=
′βλ  Because it holds that ,,,21 DCi
F
Fe
i
ii
i =>+=
′
″
−≡ εη  given (3.1) 
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and (3.2), a strict emission standard reduces the ratio of emission levels of the products (see 
Appendix 3). Because this result means a reduction of the difference in environmental qualities 
between both products, it, in turn, substantially enhances price competition. 
Let us show the effect of an emission standard on the dirtier and the cleaner products, 
respectively. Taking (7.1) and (7.2) into account, we derive:  
,4)(0)( B
C
D
D
C
D
C
C
B
D
D
B
D
D
B
D
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
q
e
q
ed
dq λ<≥
∂
∂
⇔<≥
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=                              (11.1) 
.0<
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
D
C
C
B
C
D
B
C
D
B
C
e
e
e
q
e
q
ed
dq
                                                                         (11.2) 
Given the expression of the right-hand side of (11.1), because 1<
∂
∂
C
D
D
C
e
e
e
e
 and ,14 >Bλ  we 
have .0<
D
B
D
ed
dq
 Thus, a strict emission standard increases imports of both products, compared 
with the free trade case. That is, a strict emission standard improves the environmental qualities 
of both products. This, in turn, increases the proportion of consumers in the market because the 
environmental quality improvement not only raises the valuation of the products by consumers, 
but also lowers prices. Thus, emission standards on the dirtier product are not necessarily 
import-restrictive. However, does this imply that the emission standards policy increases 
aggregate emissions, and thereby deteriorates the environment?  
Substituting (7.1) and (7.2) into (4), we have v
ee
eE
CD
DB
−
=
4
3
 where it holds that 
0
)4(
3
2 <
−
−=
∂
∂ v
ee
e
e
E
CD
C
D
B
 and .0
)4(
3
2 >
−
=
∂
∂ v
ee
e
e
E
CD
D
C
B
 Given (4) and (7.1), we have 
.3 BDD
B qeE =  Hence, the magnitude of the reduction of the quantity demanded is larger than 
that of the increase in the unit emission level. Thus, an increase in the unit emission level of the 
dirtier product reduces aggregate emissions. On the other hand, in the case of an increase in the 
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unit emission level of the cleaner product, the opposite events occur. 
The effect of an emission standard on aggregate emissions is represented by: 
.
D
C
C
B
D
B
D
B
e
e
e
E
e
E
ed
dE
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=                                                                                        (12) 
Given (12), we derive the following relationships: 
.)(21)(0)( CC
B
D
B
ed
dE ηβλ <≥⇔<≥′⇔<≥  
Because ,2>Cη  a strict emission standard increases aggregate emissions, and thereby worsens 
the environment, compared with the free trade case. 
Furthermore, substituting (7.1) and (7.2) into (5), consumer surplus is generally given by: 
2
2
22
)4(2
4 v
eee
eeeeCS
CDC
CCDDB
−
−+
=   
where it holds that 0<
∂
∂
D
B
e
CS
 and .0<
∂
∂
C
B
e
CS
 Hence, the effect on consumer surplus is: 
.0<
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
D
C
C
B
D
B
D
B
e
e
e
CS
e
CS
ed
dCS
                                                                         (13) 
Thus, a strict emission standard increases consumer surplus. 
Finally, the effect on net social surplus is expressed by .
D
B
D
B
D
B
ed
dE
ed
dCS
ed
dW γ−=  Based on 
(12) and (13), we summarize the result as follows. 
 
Proposition 1 (Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero, 2002, Proposition 6) 
When a foreign Bertrand duopoly prevails in the market, a strict emission standard on the 
dirtier product reduces (increases) net social surplus if the marginal social valuation of 
environmental damage is larger (smaller) than a certain value: .ˆ)(
D
B
D
B
B
eddE
eddCS
≡<> γγ  
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If the government substantially gives weight to concerns about the environment, ,ˆ Bγγ >  a 
strict emission standard further increases aggregate emissions rather than consumer surplus. 
Thus, paradoxically, the government should mitigate the emission standard on the dirtier 
product. Otherwise, i.e., ,ˆBγγ <  the government should impose a strict emission standard 
policy on imports of the dirtier product. 
 
3.3 Emission regulation of a cleaner product  
Secondly, following the same procedure as in 3.2, we examine the effects of emission regulation 
of the cleaner product: .0>≥ C
F
C ee  We begin by showing the effect on the ratio of unit 
emission levels as follows. 
DB
D
C
B
ed
d η
λ
βλ )(21)(0)( <≥⇔<≥
′
⇔<≥                                                              (14) 
where .
D
C
C
D
B
D
e
e
e
e
∂
∂
=
′
λ
β
 Because ,2>Dη  a strict emission regulation increases the ratio of 
emission levels of the products. This implies an increase in the difference in environmental 
qualities between both products. This, in turn, mitigates price competition. 
Let us analyze the effect of the emission regulation policy on imports of the dirtier and the 
cleaner product, respectively. We easily derive the following expressions: 
,
4
1)(0)( B
D
C
C
D
C
D
D
B
D
C
B
D
C
B
D
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
q
e
q
ed
dq
λ
>≤
∂
∂
⇔<≥
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=                             (15.1) 
.0<
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
C
D
D
B
C
C
B
C
C
B
C
e
e
e
q
e
q
ed
dq
                                                                         (15.2) 
Thus, the effect of a strict emission regulation on imports of the dirtier product is not 
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unidirectional as 1<
∂
∂
D
C
C
D
e
e
e
e
 and .1
4
1
<Bλ
 That is, a decrease in the unit emission level of the 
cleaner product directly transfers the demand for the dirtier product to the cleaner product. On 
the other hand, a decrease in the unit emission level of the cleaner product increases the demand 
for that product because it induces a decrease in the unit emission level of the dirtier product 
because of a strategic complements effect. As the former negatively affects imports, but the 
latter positively affects imports, the total effect on imports is consequently ambiguous. On the 
other hand, a strict emission regulation increases imports of the cleaner product, compared with 
the free trade case. 
The effect of emission regulation of the cleaner product on aggregate emissions is expressed 
by .
C
D
D
B
C
B
C
B
e
e
e
E
e
E
ed
dE
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=  Hence, we obtain the following relationships:  
.)(21)(0)( DB
D
C
B
ed
dE η
λ
β
>≤⇔>≤
′
⇔<≥   
Because ,2>Dη  a strict emission regulation reduces aggregate emissions, ,0>
C
B
ed
dE
 and 
thereby improves the environment, compared with the free trade case. This result is opposite to 
that of the case of an emission standard on the dirtier product. In other words, the government 
should convey a strict emission regulation not for the dirtier product, but for the cleaner product, 
to protect the environment. 
Furthermore, with respect to the effect on consumer surplus, we easily obtain .0<
C
B
ed
dCS
 
Therefore, it holds that .0<−=
C
B
C
B
C
B
ed
dE
ed
dCS
ed
dW γ  We summarize the result as follows. 
 
Proposition 2 
When a foreign Bertrand duopoly prevails in the market, a strict emission regulation on the 
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cleaner product increases net social surplus. 
 
Proposition 2 suggests that the importing country’s government should choose a unit 
emission level of the cleaner product such as to allow the profit of the foreign firm supplying 
the product to be approximately equal to the reservation profit, e.g., zero profit. 
 
 
4. Cournot Duopoly Case 
 
 In this section, following the same procedure as in Section 3, we examine the Cournot duopoly 
case. Then, comparing the results of the Bertrand and Cournot duopoly cases, we present 
evidence such that the effects of an emission standard depends on the mode of market 
competition and the degree of marginal social valuation of environmental damage. 
 
4.1 Free trade equilibrium 
The quantities in the Cournot–Nash equilibrium of the final stage are given by: 
,
4
1 v
ee
q
CD
C
D
−
=                                                                                                   (16.1) 
.
)4(
2 v
eee
eeq
CDC
CDC
C
−
−
=                                                                                            (16.2) 
where CD ee ≥  and superscript C denotes Cournot competition. Hence, the equilibrium revenue 
functions in the second stage are expressed by: 
,
)4(
2
2 vee
eR
CD
DC
D
−
=                                                                                 (17.1) 
    .
)4(
)2( 2
2
2
v
eee
eeR
CDC
CDC
C
−
−
=                                                                                 (17.2) 
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Note that if ,eee DC ==  then ,3e
vqq CD
C
C ==  and .9
2
e
vRR CD
C
C ==  Given the assumption 
of asymmetric cost functions as in (3.1) and (3.2), it holds that .CD
C
C ππ >  This means that the 
profit of a firm with an efficient technology, i.e., foreign firm C, is higher than that of one with 
an inefficient technology, i.e., foreign firm D, in the homogeneous product market. 
Taking (17.1) and (17.2) into account, the first-order conditions for profit maximization of 
the firms in the second stage are given by: 
 ,0
)4(
4 2
3 =
′
−
−
+
− D
CD
CD Fv
ee
ee
                                                                                 (18.1) 
 .0
)4(
)28)(2( 2
32
22
=
′
−
−
+−−
− C
CDC
CCDDCD Fv
eee
eeeeee
                                               (18.2) 
As shown in Appendix 4, based on (18.1) and (18.2), we derive the reaction functions of 
the unit emission levels in the Cournot duopoly case as follows: 
.0),( >′= CDCC ee φφ                                                                                          (19.1) 
,0),( <′= DCDD ee φφ                                                                                          (19.2) 
In view of (19.1) and (19.2), the unit emission levels of the products are strategic 
complements (substitutes) with respect to foreign firm C (D) in the Cournot duopoly case. A 
decrease in the unit emission level of the dirtier product reduces the market share and revenue 
of foreign firm C. So, foreign firm C has an incentive to improve the environmental quality to 
increase market share. On the other hand, a decrease in the unit emission level of the cleaner 
product similarly reduces the market share and revenue of foreign firm D. Hence, to increase 
the market share and thus the revenue, foreign firm D has to reduce the unit emission level of 
the dirtier product, even though the cost increases.  
Here, we note that there is a strategically complementary relationship with respect to the 
unit emission level of the cleaner product provided by foreign firm C, regardless of the mode of 
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market competition. Accordingly, as shown below, a strict emission standard on the dirtier 
product always improves the environmental quality of the cleaner product. However, foreign 
firm C has an incentive to reduce the unit emission level of the cleaner product to mitigate 
competitiveness in the Bertrand duopoly case. On the other hand, foreign firm C has an 
incentive to reduce that level to extend its market share in the Cournot duopoly case. 
Based on (19.1) and (19.2), there is a unique and stable Nash equilibrium in the stage in 
which the unit emission levels are determined under free trade, i.e., }.,{ CFD
CF
C ee  See Appendix 
2. Hereafter, for simplicity of expression, we do not use superscript C  of the unit emission 
level in the Cournot duopoly case. See Figure 3. 
 
4.2 Effect of an emission standard on imports, environment, and welfare 
We examine how an emission standard on the dirtier product, i.e., ,DCFD ee ≥  affects imports, 
the environment, and net social surplus in the case of a foreign Cournot duopoly. Because we 
have shown the equilibrium in the final stage in section 4.1, we present the effect of an emission 
standard on the ratio of the unit emission levels of the products, i.e., :1≥=
C
DC
e
eλ   
CC
C
D
C
ed
d ηφλλ )(2)(10)( >≤⇔′<≥⇔<≥                                                            (20) 
where .
C
D
D
C
C
C
e
e
e
e
∂
∂
=
′φλ  See also Appendix 2. Given ,2>Cη  a strict emission standard 
reduces the ratio of the emission levels of the products.  
Following a similar derivation in 3.2, we derive the effect on imports as follows. 
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.)(
48
2)( 22
C
D
D
C
CCDD
CD
D
C
C
C
C
D
C
C
D
C
C
e
e
e
e
eeee
ee
e
e
e
q
e
q
ed
dq
∂
∂
<≥
+−
⇔<≥
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=      (21.2) 
 - 17 -
Given the expression on the right-hand side of (21.1), because 1<
∂
∂
C
D
D
C
e
e
e
e
 and ,14 >Cλ  we 
have .0<
D
C
D
ed
dq
 Thus, a strict emission standard increases imports of the dirtier products, in 
contrast to the free trade case, as the valuation by consumers increases because of the emission 
standard policy. On the other hand, the effect on imports of the cleaner product is not 
unidirectional because 1
48
2
22 <+− CCDD
CD
eeee
ee
 and .1<
∂
∂
C
D
D
C
e
e
e
e
 That is, a strict emission 
standard on the dirtier product directly reduces the market share of the cleaner product, whereas 
it indirectly increases the market share as the unit emission level of the cleaner product is 
reduced through the effect of strategic complements. Thus, as a result, the effect on imports of 
the cleaner product is ambiguous. 
Substituting (17.1) and (17.2) into (4), we have v
ee
eeE
CD
CDC
−
−
=
4
3
 where it holds that 
0
)4( 2
>
−
=
∂
∂ v
ee
e
e
E
CD
C
D
C
 and .0
)4( 2
<
−
−=
∂
∂ v
ee
e
e
E
CD
D
C
C
 Although an increase in the unit 
emission level of the dirtier product reduces the quantity, it sufficiently increases the unit 
emission level and the quantity of the cleaner product. Accordingly, an increase in the unit 
emission level of the dirtier product increases aggregate emissions. On the other hand, an 
increase in the unit emission level of the cleaner product reduces its quantity, but increases the 
quantity of the dirtier product. However, it also reduces the unit emission level of the dirtier 
product. In this case, the strategic substitute effect ensures that an increase in the unit emission 
level of the cleaner product reduces aggregate emissions. 
We derive the effect of an emission standard on aggregate emissions as follows.  
.)(2)(10)( CC
C
D
C
ed
dE ηφλ >≤⇔′<≥⇔<≥   
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Because ,2>Cη  a strict emission standard reduces aggregate emissions, i.e., ,0>
D
C
ed
dE
 and 
thereby improves the environment. 
Furthermore, given (19.2), and taking 0<
∂
∂
D
C
e
CS
 and 0<
∂
∂
C
C
e
CS
 into account, the effect 
on consumer surplus under the Cournot duopoly case is given by .0<
D
C
ed
dCS
 Thus, the effect 
of an emission standard on net social surplus is given by: .0<−=
D
C
D
C
D
C
ed
dE
ed
dCS
ed
dW γ  We 
summarize the result as follows. 
 
Proposition 3 
When a foreign Cournot duopoly prevails in the market, a strict emission standard on imports of 
the dirtier product always increases net social surplus. 
 
Proposition 3 implies that a difference in the unit emission levels of the imported products is 
not allowed, i.e., .CD ee =  In other words, we may interpret that the government only admits 
quantity competition by foreign firms in a homogenous product market. Furthermore, 
Proposition 1 states that a strict emission standard on the dirtier product is not the preferable 
policy in the Bertrand duopoly case, if the government substantially gives weight to concerns 
about the environment. The difference in these results is because of the difference in the effect 
on the environment. That is, in the Bertrand (Cournot) duopoly case, a decrease in the unit 
emission level of the dirtier product degrades (improves, respectively) the environment. 
 
4.3 Emission regulation of a cleaner product  
Finally, we examine how an emission regulation on the cleaner product, i.e.,  ,0>≥ C
CF
C ee  
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affects imports, the environment, and net social surplus. Because equation (19.2) shows 
strategic substitutes relationships between the unit emission levels of the products, we easily 
derive the following expressions: 
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                                                                        (22.1) 
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dq
                                                                         (22.2) 
Thus, a strict emission regulation reduces imports of the dirtier product, whereas it increases 
imports of the cleaner product. Hence, the emission regulation on the cleaner product is an 
import barrier for the dirtier product, whereas it promotes imports of the cleaner product. Do 
these results mean that the emission control policy improves the environment and net social 
surplus? 
     Using (19.2), we directly obtain the following: 
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                                                                                 (23) 
.0<
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
C
D
D
C
C
C
C
C
e
e
e
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e
CS
ed
dCS
                                                                         (24) 
Paradoxically, a strict emission regulation increases aggregate emissions and thereby degrades 
the environment, although it increases consumer surplus. 
Therefore, taking (23) and (24) into account, with respect to the effect on net social surplus, 
we summarize our findings in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4  
When a foreign Cournot duopoly prevails in the market, a strict emission regulation on the 
cleaner product reduces (increases) net social surplus if the marginal social valuation of 
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environmental damage is larger (smaller) than a certain level: .ˆ)(
C
C
C
C
C
eddE
eddCS
≡<> γγ  
 
A decrease in the unit emission level of the cleaner product increases environmental damage, 
although it increases consumer surplus. If the government values the domestic environment 
significantly, i.e., ,ˆCγγ >  the emission regulation policy in the foreign Cournot duopoly case 
is not desirable. Furthermore, as shown in Proposition 2, a strict emission regulation on the 
cleaner product is preferable in the Bertrand duopoly case. The difference in these results 
corresponds to the difference in the effect on the environment. That is, in a foreign Bertrand 
(Cournot) duopoly, the effect of an increase in the emission level of the cleaner product on the 
environment is positive (negative, respectively). 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
We have examined the impact of emission standards as TBT on imports, the environment, and 
social welfare, based on the green market model presented by Moraga-González and Padrón-
Fumero (2002). The main conclusions of this paper state that an emission standard policy for 
polluting products does not necessarily restrict imports of the product, whereas it may worsen 
the environment and social welfare. That is, we have shown that the effects of an emission 
standard policy on the environment and net social surplus depend on the mode of competition 
and the degree of social marginal valuation of environmental damage. 
There are some remaining issues as follows. First, because we have dealt with an emission 
standard policy as a TBT or NTB in the paper, it might not be natural to assume that domestic 
firms do not exist in the green market of the importing country. But, in the case that a domestic 
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firm produces the product, we can derive the same results as those in the paper.  
Second, we have assumed that the importing government can commit to the emission 
standard policy before the firms decide the investment or product line associated with 
environmental qualities of the products. However, we should consider the timing of an emission 
standard policy because the government may have an incentive to change the emission standard 
after firms have invested. Related to the first issue, for example, we can consider that after a 
domestic firm decides to investment to produce a cleaner product, the government may choose a 
prohibitive level of an emission standard to restrict imports of a dirtier product. In this case, the 
domestic firm can be a monopolistic producer to provide the cleaner product to domestic 
consumers in the green market of the importing country. So, we should analyze the effect of the 
prohibitive emission standard policy on social welfare. 
Third, we have supposed that the firms do not bear the burden of production costs. However, 
in the context of endogenous quality choice and strategic R&D policy (Jinji and Toshimitsu, 
2007), we examined that the nature of reaction functions with respect to qualities and the first-
order properties of revenue functions depend on the degree of marginal production costs.  Thus, 
with nonzero production costs, our conclusions may be revised. 
Fourth, we have analyzed the effect of environmental policy on imports, the environment, 
and social welfare. However, we need to address the effect of traditional trade policies, i.e., 
tariff and import quota, on them. On the effect of tariffs, see Toshimitsu (2006a). Furthermore, 
by the classification of Besanko (1987), our model is in line to the analysis of design or 
technological standards of pollution. In this paper, we have discussed the effect of an emission 
standard that responds to a design standard policy for environmental quality of the products. He 
also analyzes performance standards of pollution. If we can interpret import quotas as 
performance standards, we should analyze the effect of import quotas as performance standards 
on the environment and social welfare (Toshimitsu, 2006b).  
Finally, we have discussed an emission standard policy from a viewpoint where the 
 - 22 -
pollution is a by-product of consumption of the products. However, recently, it is clear that the 
environment and nature in a worldwide context is actually damaged by the production of 
environmental-friendly goods such as bio-gasoline. This implies that a cleaner product in the 
consumption process is a dirtier product in the production process, based on the terms of our 
paper. Thus, we should analyze the effects of environmental policy, considering environmental 
performance of products from a viewpoint of the production and consumption processes. 
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Appendix 1 
We obtain the nature of the revenue functions in (8.1) and (8.2) as follows. The first-order 
properties are: 
,)(
4
70)( DC
D
B
D ee
e
R
<≥⇔<≥
∂
∂
 ,0<
∂
∂
C
B
C
e
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∂
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D
B
C
e
R
                 (A.1) 
Given the first expression, the effect on the revenue of foreign firm D is not unidirectional. 
However, to warrant the existence of an interior solution, we assume such that .
4
7
DC ee <  The 
second expression shows that a decrease in the unit emission level of the cleaner product 
increases its firm’s revenue. Furthermore, the third (fourth) expression shows that a decrease in 
the unit emission level of the cleaner (dirtier, respectively) product increases (reduces, 
respectively) the revenue of foreign firm D (C). That is, a decrease in the unit emission level of 
the cleaner product increases the difference in environmental qualities of the products. This, in 
turn, mitigates competitiveness. On the other hand, a decrease in the unit emission level of the 
dirtier product enhances price competition as it reduces the difference in the environmental 
qualities of the products.  
The second-order properties are: 
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      (A.2) 
Because the revenue functions are not necessarily concave, the cost functions should be 
sufficiently convex to ensure that the second-order conditions hold.  
Furthermore, the positive cross partial derivative in the third expression implies that the unit 
emission levels of the products are strategic complements in the Bertrand duopoly case. That is, 
the prices of both products fall because of a decrease in the unit emission level of the dirtier 
product, as the difference in environmental qualities of the products is likely to vanish. Thus, 
foreign firm C improves the environmental quality to reduce the strict price competition. On the 
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other hand, prices and revenues of both foreign firms increase by a decrease in the unit emission 
level of the cleaner product, as the environmental quality difference between both products 
widens. Hence, there are two effects of a decrease in the unit emission level by foreign firm D 
on its revenue: a negative effect because of strict price competition, and a positive effect 
because of an increase in the valuation by consumers. As the latter effect is greater than the 
former, foreign firm D has an incentive to improve the environmental quality by less than the 
degree of improvement in the cleaner product, even though the cost increases. 
 
Appendix 2 
The determinant of the matrix can be generally expressed as: 
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Furthermore, the following equations hold: 
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Given (A.4), the determinant in (A.3) can be rewritten as:  
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where ,,,21 DCi
F
Fe
i
ii
i =>+=
′
″
−≡ εη  holds, given (3.1) and (3.2).  
In the Bertrand duopoly case, ,Bk =  taking into account the positive cross partial 
derivatives, the sign of the determinant is positive. Thus, the stability condition is satisfied. On 
the other hand, in the Cournot duopoly case, ,Ck =  because the signs of the two cross partial 
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derivatives are different, the sign of the determinant is not necessarily positive. Thus, it is 
assumed that .0>ΔC  
 
Appendix 3 
In what follows, as we have the same results regardless of the model of competition, we omit 
superscript .,CBk =  In general, it holds that: 
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Hence, taking (A.4) into account, we derive:  
.,,,,)(21)( jiDCji
e
e
e
e
i
i
j
j
i ≠=<≥⇔<≥
∂
∂ η                                                      (A.7) 
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Appendix 4 
Given (17.1) and (17.2), the first-order properties are given by: 
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∂
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∂
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                                                            (A.8) 
The second expression of these properties implies that an increase in the unit emission level of 
foreign firm j increases the revenue of foreign firm i. That is, an increase in the unit emission 
level implies that environmental quality of the product deteriorates. This in turn reduces the 
market share of foreign firm j, allowing foreign firm i to increase its market share and thus its 
revenue.  
Furthermore, the second-order properties are given by: 
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As the sign of the first expression is positive, the cost function of a unit emission level is 
assumed sufficiently convex, so that the second-order condition for profit maximization holds. 
In addition, the second expression indicates the followings. An increase in the unit emission 
level of the cleaner product reduces the difference in environmental qualities between the 
products. As the difference becomes small, a competition among the firms intensifies. 
Accordingly, the marginal revenue of foreign firm D declines. On the other hand, the third 
expression indicates that an increase in the unit emission level of the dirtier product increases 
the quality difference, and thus increases the marginal revenue of foreign firm C. The signs of 
the cross partial derivatives of the second and the third equations mean that the unit emission 
levels of the products are strategic complements (substitutes) for foreign firm C (D) in the 
Cournot duopoly case.  
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